are names tied to legal controversies over the withdrawal of medical treatment at the end of life. In re Quinlan 1 arose at a time when the rules for decisionmaking for incompetent patients were still unformed and inchoate. It set the framework of analysis for most of the subsequent development in the field.
I. LEGAL CONTEXT: QUINLAN AND ITS PROGENY
Both Karen Ann Quinlan and Theresa Marie Schiavo spent their last days in persistent vegetative states. Karen Ann Quinlan had lost consciousness and stopped breathing after combining drugs and alcohol at a party, which led to prolonged anoxia-an insufficient supply of oxygen in the blood. 6 After Ms. Quinlan lived dependent upon a respirator for seven months, her loving father and family requested that the respirator be removed. 7 Because the situation was new both for doctors and the law, it led to judicial reviews that culminated in a landmark 1976 decision that set the substantive norms for decisionmaking for incompetent persons in New Jersey and many other jurisdictions as well. 8 The New Jersey Supreme Court proceeded by first finding that the State's interests in preserving life, preventing suicide, and upholding medical ethics were not sufficient to outweigh a person's common law and constitutional right to refuse necessary medical care. 9 The Court then made the pivotal move on which most later state and federal analysis hinges-the incompetent patient should not have any fewer rights than the competent person just because the patient is incompetent. 10 To prevent that disparity, the incompetent patient should be treated as if he or she were competent: If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive, vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident of her right of privacy, . . . then arena; and the ways in which politicians used such high-profile events to attract support and push other agendas. There was even a story on the conservative judge who found himself at the center of a storm of controversy for applying the law. Abby Goodnough it should not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice. The only practical way to prevent destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment . . . as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances. If their conclusion is in the affirmative, this decision should be accepted by a society the overwhelming majority of whose members would, we think, in similar circumstances, exercise such a choice in the same way for themselves or for those closest to them. 11 In Quinlan, this meant that her father's decision to have the respirator removed would be deemed a reasonable approximation of what Karen would have chosen if competent or so physicians and the courts reviewing the matter might so decide. 12 Although the Court also suggested that hospital ethics committees should review such decisions, 13 neither ethics committee nor judicial review of the proxy judgment was legally required. The New Jersey Supreme Court's recognition of a substantive approach based on substituted judgment became the legal paradigm of decisionmaking in most other states.
In adopting the analytic paradigm etched in Quinlan, the easiest cases for state courts and legislatures were patients in persistent vegetative states and patients with advance directives. All states facing these questions adopted norms and procedures that allowed a proxy or surrogate decision-maker to withhold treatment, though some states were stricter than others in determining when treatment could be withdrawn or withheld. 14 The strictest states required that there be clear and convincing evidence of a prior directive or oral declaration on this issue, even for 11. Id. The assumption here was that not treating incompetent persons as if they were competent would harm them or treat them unfairly by subjecting them to burdens that competent persons do not face. But this conflates the question of whether we treat or withhold treatment from patients with the grounds or criteria for such decisions. Because a competent person may refuse treatment does not mean that society must treat incompetent persons as if they have made such a choice when they are incapable of doing so.
12. 16 The more difficult cases were cases in which the patient lacked a prior directive, but the patient was conscious and permanently incompetent, with varying degrees of dementia and ability to communicate. All states allowed treatment of conscious but incompetent patients to be withheld when there was clear evidence of a prior directive. In cases in which a directive was lacking, states varied as to whether they would allow a proxy to infer what the patient would have decided, or whether they would require clear and convincing evidence that such a prior choice had actually been made. 17 
II. FLORIDA LAW
The Florida courts and Legislature adopted a legal position consistent with Quinlan. Florida's first major engagement with 15 20 the Florida Supreme Court broadened the right and added specificity. It found that a person who was incompetent and conscious rather than comatose had a constitutional right to have her previously expressed wishes, whether expressed orally or in writing, followed by a guardian without court approval. 21 These results were then codified in the Health Care Advance Directives provisions of Florida's civil rights statutes. 22 Those statutes make clear that a person is free to make an advance directive refusing treatment, appoint a healthcare proxy, or have a family member or other act as a proxy to give effect to the wishes expressed in the advance directive when the person became incompetent. Unless challenged, a healthcare provider must comply within seven days with the terms of the advance directive or transfer care to a provider who will. 23 If there is no living will, then the patient's spouse, adult child, parent, or designated others may make that decision.
Any health care decision . . . must be based on the proxy's informed consent and on the decision the proxy reasonably believes the patient would have made under the circumstances. If there is no indication of what the patient would have chosen, the proxy may consider the patient's best interest in deciding that proposed treatments are to be withheld or that treatments currently in effect are to be withdrawn. 24 Before exercising the incapacitated patient's rights to select or define healthcare under that provision, the proxy must consult with physicians about the nature of the patient's condition and be satisfied that the patient is in an end-stage, terminal, or persistent vegetative state, that there is no hope of recovery, and that 18. 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984 The Florida statute was one of the more liberal laws in the nation in that it explicitly allowed non-treatment if there was no evidence of a prior directive and the non-treatment would serve the best interest of the patient. That standard left many questions open, but it provided a workable way for families and physicians to resolve these questions in an ethically sound and legally acceptable way. Until Schiavo, agreement among families and physicians was likely if a patient was in a persistent vegetative state and in many other end-of-life situations as well.
III. APPLYING THE STANDARD IN SCHIAVO:
A LEGAL ASSESSMENT Families and physicians have usually been in agreement about decisions to provide or withhold/withdraw treatment from incompetent patients. The few disputes that have percolated up to the courts have been of two types. One type has involved cases in which doctors or hospitals refused to follow advance directives or proxy requests for or against treatment. 27 28 In 1990, Terri suffered a cardiac arrest and brain damage due to lack of oxygen. 29 She was given a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) to provide nutrition and hydration and Michael was appointed her guardian. 30 Several hospital or rehabilitation facilities provided care for Terri over the next several years. 31 At a certain point, Michael, who had been appointed guardian of Terri in 1990, and Terri's parents, the Schindlers, had a falling out. 32 A dispute arose over the proceeds of the malpractice litigation arising from Terri's treatment after her cardiac arrest. 33 Michael and the Schindlers also disagreed over the course of the therapy being provided to Terri. 34 In May 1998, Michael petitioned a Florida court to authorize the removal of Terri's PEG tube. 35 The Schindlers opposed the request, claiming that Terri would have wanted to remain alive. 36 Following a trial, Pinellas County Circuit Judge George Greer ruled in February 2000 that Terri was in a persistent vegetative state and would have wanted the PEG tube removed. 37 The Second District Court of Appeal upheld the ruling, and the Florida Supreme Court declined review. 38 The Schindlers then began a series of legal actions that delayed the execution of the court's decision to have the feeding tube 28. Kathy L. Cerminara 40 that she was not in fact in a persistent vegetative state; 41 that she was being denied treatment that would benefit her; 42 that a papal statement about the "naturalness" of artificial nutrition and hydration would have affected her decision; 43 and that she had never had her own lawyer. 44 The Florida courts have assiduously-perhaps too assiduously-given these claims a full airing. At one point, five neurologists were appointed to advise the courts (two named by the husband, two by the family, and the fifth by the other four). 45 At least three different guardians ad litem served throughout the litigation, the last, a professor of law and public health. 46 Throughout these proceedings, the courts hearing evidence or reviewing it have consistently found that Terri was in a persistent vegetative state, had no hope of improving, and if competent, would have wanted the PEG tube removed. 47 One extraordinary turn of events in this ongoing saga occurred in October 2003, when Florida politicians succeeded in stopping execution of the judicial order to have her feeding tube removed. 48 This action occurred after all avenues of judicial relief had been exhausted, and the gastrostomy tube was withdrawn pursuant to court order on October 15, 2003. 49 The Schindlers, however, disputed that Terri would have chosen withdrawal of the PEG tube if competent. In the early stages of the case, the Schindlers argued that there was no clear and convincing evidence, as Terri's husband asserted, that she would want feeding stopped. 64 Her parents denied that she had ever made such statements and claimed that they were fabricated by the husband out of his desire to be rid of Terri so that he could marry the woman with whom he had subsequently fathered two children. 65 appear to be following a moving object, but in fact is still unconscious. During the end stages of the Schiavo case, a news report of PET scans of the language-processing areas of the brain showing that some people in comas still have awareness even if they lack the ability to respond could only confirm the suspicions of skeptics. 70 According to tests of five patients, the same areas of the brain lit up when patients in comas and those not in comas were subjected to language stimuli. 71 After a full airing of this claim, the trial court again found that Terri was in a persistent vegetative state and ordered that the feeding tube be removed. 72 Yet, spurred by misleading media and website presentations, the impression persisted that there was serious doubt about whether Terri was in fact in a persistent vegetative state, thus opening the door to the claim that she should be kept alive so that she might have a chance to improve. 73 The reframing of the case as one involving a person who was not in a persistent vegetative state but was conscious and communicative became a key strategic move that helped mobilize . But there is no good reason to take this study as undercutting the medical findings. First, Terri Schiavo has been repeatedly found to be in a persistent vegetative state, not merely a coma. Second, no one has replicated the study, and no one would claim that this finding alone, which has not been published in a scientific journal, has settled the point. Nobel Prize author Nadine Gordimer describes a person in a vegetative state as follows: "[W]hat did visits help a man . . . who did not know there was anyone present, did not know that he himself was present. . . . What is a presence? Must consciousness be receptive, cognitive, responsive, for there to be a presence? Didn't the flesh have a consciousness of its own, the body signaling [sic] its presence through the lungs struggling to breathe with the help of some machine, the kidneys producing urine trickling into a bag. . . ." Nadine Gordimer, None to Accompany Me 210 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1994).
71. Carey, supra n. 70, at A1. 72. Cerminara & Goodman, supra n. 28. To assess this claim, the trial court appointed five neurologists as experts. Although the two experts named by the Schindlers claimed that they had success with treating patients in comas and/or Terri was not in a coma, the other three said the evidence was clear that she had lost almost all cortical function, she was in a persistent vegetative state, and there were no known published treatments that could help her.
E.g. Hannity and Colmes (Fox News Network Mar. 10, 2005) (TV broadcast).
A typical example of this media attention, this segment featured a business man, Robert Herring, who recounted his offer to Michael Schiavo of one million dollars if he would cede his decisionmaking rights over Terri to the parents. Herring based his offer on his perception that "there [was] hope for Terri" and that he wanted to "give the lady a chance." Shown on a split screen were videotape images of Terri in a hospital gown following the movement of a balloon with her eyes, suggesting to viewers that she was conscious and not comatose.
widespread support from the disability-rights and right-to-life communities and eventually Governor Bush, the Florida Legislature and members of Congress. By arguing that Terri was conscious and could be treated, the Schindlers were able to transform the case from one about the inferred wishes or best interests of a permanently comatose person to a story about the unjustified killing of a disabled person whose condition could be improved if not for an uncaring husband interested in inheriting her malpractice settlement and marrying the woman with whom he had fathered two children.
This reframing of the situation brought the case within the discourse of the disability-rights community, thereby attracting the energies of the many groups fighting against devaluation of life or denial of medical care solely because of disability. One wing of that movement took a vitalist position: if any life remains at all, it must be protected, no matter how unconscious, compromised, or debilitated that person is. 74 This slant on the case also brought in right-to-life advocates, most notably Randall Terry, 75 and groups committed to protecting innocent human life. 76 Because gastrostomy feeding was also at issue, the case could also be presented as one of "killing by starvation," which further mobilized right-to-life support. 77 After the invalidation of Terri's Law opened the door to the removal of the PEG tube, the Schindlers then argued that Terri was being sentenced to death without the due process that even killers on death row received. The Schiavo case grew and proliferated because of a confluence of two factors. One was the Schindlers' animosity toward Michael and their apparent inability to recognize an unpleasant medical reality. The second was the presentation of Terri's condition as one that right-to-life and disability-rights groups could argue involved killing an innocent human life. 79 While only the most vitalist of those groups would argue that all people in persistent vegetative states should be maintained as long as possible, the ambiguity introduced in April 2001 of whether she was in fact in such a condition enabled the case to be reframed in a way that raised broader issues about the right to life and treatment accorded to disabled persons, eventually dragging both the Republican-controlled Florida Legislature and the United States Congress into the fray.
These developments raised two issues that deserve more attention: (1) whether there is a need for reform in the law concerning the withdrawal of treatment from comatose and other incompetent persons, and (2) the role that the right-to-life movement is likely to play in future end-of-life and related controversies.
IV. DECISIONMAKING FOR INCOMPETENT PERSONS: IS LEGAL REFORM NEEDED?
Although the Schiavo case paraded itself as a dispute about the facts used in applying a settled legal standard, the case has drawn attention to the inherent ambiguities in the decisional paradigm of substituted judgment-determining what the patient would have chosen if competent. The biggest hole revealed was the indeterminacy of the substituted judgment test and the way that it could be manipulated in its application. Although the malleability of the test was well known to bioethicists, what was unique was how a well-financed litigant was able to appeal to the uncertainty of the test to keep the case going for so long. Having lost in the courts, the Schindlers' legislative allies might seek changes in the substituted judgment paradigm that will make decisionmaking at the end of life even more difficult than it is now. 
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A. Weaknesses and Strengths of Substituted Judgment
The substituted-judgment paradigm has two main weaknesses and one strength. One weakness is the lack of clarity about what exactly is meant by "what the person would have chosen if competent." As previously shown, there are at least three ways to read that standard. 80 These include what the person now if competent with competent values and interests would choose (the "Time 1 Self"); what a competent person with the values and interests of someone who is incompetent would choose (the "Time 2 Self"); or what best serves the interests of the incompetent person as he or she is now. All of these interpretations involve subtle analyses of facts that are not easily specified or operationalized. It is a separate question, however, whether we should try to make more specific what the test means.
The second weakness is what counts as evidence of that choice. A written advance directive would seem to be most reliable, but even then, one can raise questions about whether the maker of the advance directive fully understood that her Time 1 Self directive would apply at the stage when the maker would no longer have the interests and values that she had by virtue of her competency at the Time 1 Self stage when she made the directive. But if there was no written or specific oral directive, should statements made casually while watching a television program or news report about similar cases be given credence? In addition to issues of the credibility of the evidence, there is the deeper problem of why Time 1 Self preferences should control decisions at the Time 2 Self stage when the person's interests were likely to be very different from what they were as perceived through the lens of competency at Time 1.
Ironically, the very weaknesses of the test are also the key to its appeal. Despite the conceptual confusion and vagueness of the test, the idea of doing "what the patient would want if competent" is nevertheless alluring because it displaces attention from and By asking what the person would have wanted if competent, we may pretend that we are respecting the person as a choosing, competent individual and deciding the question on a patientcentered, not an other-directed, basis. A more realistic appraisal is that we are making judgments about the value of the life of permanently comatose or incompetent patients, but do not want to do so explicitly. When persons have permanently lost their rational faculties, the ability to experience benefits and harms, and the capacity for symbolic interaction that make life meaningful, there is a widespread though implicit recognition that physicians and families need not be as diligent or exigent in preserving their lives as they would with patients who are fully competent. While this obfuscating function would not sanction murder, it does lead to the acceptance of treatment withdrawal when proxy or surrogate decision-makers and physicians agree that the time to stop treatment has arrived. 81 Making such judgments explicitly and directly is difficult, and perhaps even dangerous because of the ease of extending such evaluations to less marginal cases. As a result, it is better to make those judgments surreptitiously in the guise of inferred autonomy and the appearance of the patient's choice, as the substituted judgment test enables us to do. Our feelings and practices are caught between the need for sunlight and transparency and the reluctance to make difficult decisions openly (between Louis Brandeis' dictum that "the best disinfectant is sunlight" 82 81. This idea is evident in sociological findings and in such ideas as Norman Cantor's constructed preference approach. Norman L. and T.S. Eliot's reminder that "humankind cannot bear too much reality" 83 ).
B. The Likelihood of Legislative Changes
Having cast the spotlight of public scrutiny on the legal standards for end-of-life decisionmaking for incompetent patients, an important question is whether the passions stimulated by the Schiavo case will lead to legislative changes that make decisionmaking at the end of life more difficult than it now is for families and physicians. The short-run danger is greatest in Florida, but right-to-life and disability-rights groups may seek legislation in other states as well.
Professor Kathy Cerminara has identified the most immediate procedural and substantive changes that are likely to occur in Florida. 84 On the procedural side, the most likely change would be to prevent anyone who, like Michael Schiavo, stands to inherit from the incompetent patient to act as guardian or proxy for endof-life decisions. But since spouses and family members may often inherit under state intestacy statutes or wills, they would be barred from serving in this capacity. Yet they are the ones that know the patient best and the ones most often there to serve as a surrogate or proxy decision-maker. A law barring them from serving in a proxy or guardian capacity would be a major impediment in many end-of-life settings.
On the substantive side, Professor Cerminara is also on strong ground in decrying any legislative move to require that there be an explicit advance directive to have gastrostomy tubes and other means of medical nutrition and hydration stopped. 85 Such proposals drape the highly medical nature of these interventions with the symbolic associations of taking food and water. In this case, the question of whether a surgical intervention should occur and then chemical nutrients be delivered to the body is intertwined with the symbolically charged act of denying a person food and water. Just as it has long been accepted that discontinuing oxygen to a person on a respirator is appropriately described as withholding medical care, so too is the discontinuation of artificial nutrition and hydration through a surgically inserted tube in the stomach a form of withholding medical care. 86 Medically provided nutrition and hydration deserve no special status or need for protection once the decision to withhold or withdraw medical treatment from an incompetent patient has been made. The bills before the Florida Legislature to require an advance directive to have gastrostomy tubes removed would treat PEG differently from dialysis, respirators, and other medical interventions. 87 Because so few people make advance directives, the bills would prolong unnecessarily the dying of incompetent persons and the suffering of their families. 88 The bills should be defeated.
I am less troubled by Professor Cerminara's concern about legislative change that would limit the ability to use constructed preferences to satisfy the substituted-judgment test. 89 That issue arose at the first evidentiary hearing before Judge Greer. 90 Michael Schiavo's lawyer had introduced sociological evidence about the preferences of people at the end of life, showing an overwhelming preference not to be kept alive on machines. 91 95 The difficulty then posed is that judgments based on incompetent patients' best interests are highly fraught with normative significance, even in cases of persistent vegetative states. The logic of persistent vegetation, for example, assumes that a person is totally unconscious and experiences no pain or sensation, even though reflex and involuntary movements occur. If so, persons in persistent vegetative states have no interests. Whether they continue to live or die should then be of no moment to them. On that logic, one could refuse or continue treatment, take organs from them to transplant to others, or use them in intrusive medical experiments simply because without interests, they are no longer capable of being harmed. Yet it is doubtful that any legislature would pass legislation that explicitly recognizes that persons in persistent vegetative states have suffered the equivalent of death or that they may be actively killed. 96 I predict that the Schiavo case will not lead to much remedial legislation to correct flaws in the substituted-judgment approach to decisionmaking for incompetent patients. Our current system, though flawed, has done a serviceable job of blending notions of autonomy, protection of the weak and vulnerable, and respect for life. The Schiavo case has shown how misperceptions, denial, and displacement of other conflicts can prolong a case and make it difficult to resolve, but the case has not uncovered any fatal gaps 96. Those judgments are even more difficult when the patient is incompetent but conscious, and lacks a living will. Because such patients have sensations and may interact to some limited extent with others, it will be much more difficult to convince people that they have no interest in living further. Unless the medical interventions are highly burdensome, this means that standard interventions such as respiratory assistance and gastrostomy feeding would be continued. Stetson Law Review [Vol. 35 or flaws in the fairness of the substituted-judgment standard. In the end, the Schiavo case teaches us very little about how decisionmaking for incompetent persons should be handled.
V. FUTURE RIGHT-TO-LIFE CONTROVERSIES
Even though the Schiavo case is unlikely to change the rules for end-of-life care, it is nevertheless important as an indicator of the deep ethical and cultural fault lines that now exist in American public life. While those divides are notably present in areas as diverse as same-sex marriage and United States membership in an international criminal court, ethical clashes are particularly pronounced around issues of life, death, and biotechnology. No matter how beneficial in other regards, any change seen as loosening the commitment to respect for human life in these areas is staunchly resisted. Given the growing power of the right-to-life movement, that divide is likely to continue for some time.
With assisted suicide, for example, we may reliably expect few other states to adopt an Oregon-type law that allows a small number of terminally ill patients to hasten their own death with drugs prescribed after repeated requests to their physicians. 97 Indeed, the Department of Justice's efforts to remove the federal controlled-substances license from Oregon doctors who participate in assisted suicide may effectively confine that practice to the underground, thus losing the benefits of transparency and sunlight to monitor its use as presently exists. 98 Any system of active euthanasia, such as that now practiced in the Netherlands, 99 is even more distant.
It also means that we will need to be punctilious about other issues that arise at the border of life and death. These include issues of medical futility, the use of the incompetent in research or as a source of organs, and proposals to respecify the precise moment of death to facilitate the retrieval of organs under dead cadaveric donor protocols. 100 Although such patients may have few or no interests, as is the case when they are in persistent vegetative states, the symbolic aura that surrounds comatose, heart-beating persons will make it very difficult to accept such changes, no matter what their benefits or how small and marginal the compromise with vitalist values. Even surrounding them with procedural safeguards, such as the requirement of an advance directive specifying the precise activity at issue and review by independent physicians or ethics committees, will not be a guarantee that change will be acceptable.
The "culture of life" drama being reenacted in the Schiavo controversy has a parallel in the embryonic stem cell (ESC) debate. Although that debate occurs at the beginning rather than the end of life, it too involves a clash between strongly held vitalist views and a more pragmatic approach to questions of human dignity. Those persons who insist that preimplantation human embryos are living members of the human species oppose their use in research or therapy. 101 Research proponents, on the other hand, stress the embryo's lack of neurological development and potential for actually being placed in a uterus. Stricter standards at the end of life will prevent some patients in severely compromised conditions from dying sooner than they otherwise would, thus adding to the burdens on caregivers and the healthcare system. Not permitting or funding embryonic stem cell research and therapy, on the other hand, could delay or prevent the development of therapies for millions of people. The Schiavo and ESC debates have thus energized both sides in the culture-of-life wars that will continue to divide the country for some time to come. 
